Another surprising omission came during Thursday’s testimony of Mark Negley, a Boeing engineer. Negley conducted the initial design study for titanium and has assisted OceanGate with test equipment and consulting for nearly a decade. He testified about the challenges of building a carbon fiber structure.
The panel did not ask Negley about an email he sent Rush in 2018 in which he shared analysis based on information Rush provided. “We believe there is a high risk of a major failure at or below 4,000 meters,” he wrote. The email included a graph showing the skull and crossbones at about that depth.
Lots of red flags, few solid answers
This week we also presented technical testimony from other experts on submarine design and classification. Everyone was skeptical or even critical of OceanGate’s decision to go into business titanium using a novel carbon fiber hull after little testing and relying on an unproven acoustic monitoring system to provide real-time information on hull integrity.
“Instant delamination and collapse can occur in less than a millisecond,” testified Roy Thomas of the American Bureau of Shipping. “Real-time monitoring couldn’t capture it.”
Donald Kramer, a materials engineer with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), testified that there were manufacturing defects in the composite fuselage. He described titaniumThe wreckage said it had disintegrated into layers of carbon fiber consistent with its multi-stage construction, but declined to offer an opinion on what caused the implosion.
Neither the hull manufacturers nor OceanGate’s technical director at the time of its construction were called to testify.
MBI Chairman Jason Neubauer said at a news conference after the hearings: “We don’t have to get testimony from every witness. Until we receive factual information and data from the company, through forensics, and from other witnesses, it is possible that we will not interview every identified witness.”
Kramer noted that data from 2022, when after titanium surfaced after diving into Titanicshowed a disturbing change in stresses in the hull. OceanGate’s then-chief technical officer, Phil Brooks, testified that he was probably not qualified to analyze the data and that Rush had personally ordered the submersible for the final dives.
Over the past two weeks, multiple witnesses testified about Rush’s central role in business, engineering and operational decisions, as well as his abrasive personality and temperament. Matthew McCoy, a 2017 OceanGate technician and former Coast Guard officer, testified today about a conversation he had with Rush about obtaining titanium registered and checked.
McCoy recalled that Rush said that if the Coast Guard became a problem, “he would buy a congressman and the problem would go away.” McCoy handed in his notice the next day.
What will happen next
Once the public hearings are completed, the Coast Guard MBI will begin preparing a final report. This may include the final cause of the fatal accident, referral for criminal investigation, and recommendations for future policy and regulation.
The titaniumThe hull and porthole figured prominently in expert testimony about the potential physical causes of the implosion. Regardless of which component ultimately failed, witnesses criticized everyone from designers and manufacturers to OceanGate’s operations team and executive decision makers. This can make it hard to establish a single cause or single out who is at fault, with the exception of Stockton Rush.