After they left, titanium was rebuilt with a recent hull that was never tested to industry standards or certified by an independent, third-party agency. Patrick Lahey, CEO of submarine manufacturer Triton Submarines, said certifying the recent hull was not only possible but necessary for safety.
“We were developing and certifying the deepest-diving submarine in the world at the same time they were developing this amateur invention,” he testified. “There was absolutely no reason they couldn’t certify it.”
A History of Troubles Titanic Missions
OceanGate’s first missions on Titanic in 2021 they struggled with problems, including: titaniumThe titanium forward dome fell off after the dive, there were worrying readings from the acoustic monitoring system, and an engine failure at 11,000 feet. One slide of Coast Guard evidence showed 70 equipment problems requiring correction after dives that season. The situation improved somewhat the following year, with only 48 reported problems. But they included dead batteries that extended the mission from about seven hours to 27, and damage to the submarine itself during recovery.
One dive in 2022 ended with a mysterious noisy bang and pop upon surfacing. Antonella Wilby, an engineering subcontractor for OceanGate, was so concerned about the bang that she considered notifying OceanGate management. She testified that another employee warned her that she risked a lawsuit if she did so. “Everyone should feel comfortable talking about safety without fear of retaliation, and I didn’t see that at all,” she said. “I was completely dismissed.”
On titaniumpenultimate dive of 2023, contractor Tym Catterson admitted to failing to carry out safety checks; titanium The ship was listed at a 45-degree angle for an hour, with many people on board as a result.
Conflicting Views on Carbon Fiber Hull
Security statements were contradictory. titaniumunique carbon-fiber hull. Dyer noted that carbon fiber could be a good solution for deep-sea submarines, and Nissen was adamant that computer modeling and an acoustic warning system meant it could be used indefinitely. Lochridge, Catterson and former human resources director Bonnie Carl were far more skeptical about the hull’s design and implementation. But all three admitted they were not engineers.
Testimony next week from Nissen’s successor, Phil Brooks, other submarine engineers, and a Boeing carbon-fiber expert should answer many of these questions. In particular, testimony next Wednesday from an engineer at the National Transportation Safety Board’s Materials Laboratory about titaniumThe plane wreckage may indicate the physical cause of the implosion.
Where was the Coast Guard?
At several points, investigators indicated that titanium should have been inspected by the U.S. Coast Guard before carrying paying passengers. No one interviewed could say why that hadn’t happened, although OceanGate apparently contacted the Coast Guard on numerous occasions to advise of its underwater operations.
Lochridge also testified that OSHA told him in 2018 that it had forwarded his safety complaints to the Coast Guard. At least one of the five U.S. Coast Guard witnesses scheduled to be called next week is in Puget Sound, near OceanGate’s headquarters, and may be able to comment.
U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. John Lockwood, who joined OceanGate’s board in 2013, is not listed as a witness. Lochridge and Carl testified that Lockwood’s role was to provide oversight and glossy interaction with the Coast Guard.
Missing witnesses
Lockwood is not the only notable absentee from the courtroom. A number of witnesses this week testified about the key roles of OceanGate employees, including Wendy Rush, Scott Griffith and Neil McCurdy, in making key business, regulatory and operational decisions throughout OceanGate’s history and on the day of the accident. No one has been called to testify. None of the hull manufacturers have been called either. The Coast Guard has given no reason, other than to deny that these witnesses could invoke their Fifth Amendment rights to refuse to answer questions.